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INTRODUCTION
The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
(“RICO”), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (2006), prohibits a “person” from
engaging in a “pattern of racketeering activity” in connection with the
acquisition, establishment, or conduct of an “enterprise.” 4 Violations of
the statute can trigger both civil and criminal penalties, 5 including treble
damages and attorneys’ fees on the civil side. RICO’s broad language
created a potential for abuse of civil actions, which has long been
recognized. 6 For more than a decade, however, courts were not
confronted by this potential. “Throughout the 1970s and early 1980s,
RICO’s civil remedies went virtually unnoticed and unused.” 7 Even
criminal suits under RICO were rarely filed before 1982, averaging
twenty per year in that period. 8 Many of the precedents during these
formative years read RICO in a broad, remedial fashion without fear of
misapplication. 9 The potential for abuse of RICO, especially on the
civil side, remained latent.
4. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961(3), (5), (4) (2006) (defining, respectively, “person,”
“pattern of racketeering activity,” and “enterprise”); see also id. § 1961(1) (defining the
key term “racketeering activity”).
5. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1963, 1964 (2006).
6. See, e.g., Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 500 (1985) (“We
nonetheless recognize that, in its private civil version, RICO is evolving into something
quite different from the original conception of its enactors.” (citing Arthur F. Mathews,
et al., Report of the Ad Hoc Civil RICO Task Force of the A.B.A. Section of
Corporation, Banking and Business Law (1985) [hereinafter ABA Report])). This
concern was made more explicit in Justice Marshall’s dissent in Sedima. Id. at 506
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (“Many a prudent defendant, facing ruinous exposure, will
decide to settle even a case with no merit. It is thus not surprising that civil RICO has
been used for extortive purposes, giving rise to the very evils that it was designed to
combat.” (citing ABA Report, supra)).
7. A. Darby Dickerson, Curtailing Civil RICO’s Long Reach: Establishing New
Boundaries for Venue and Personal Jurisdiction Under 18 U.S.C. § 1965, 75 NEB. L.
REV. 476, 485 (1996).
8. “During RICO’s first decade, there were fewer than 220 prosecutions—or a
little over 20 per year on average. Since 1982, the yearly average has exceeded 100.”
Samuel A. Alito, Jr., Racketeering Made Simple(r), in THE RICO RACKET 1, 11 (Gary L.
McDowell ed., 1989).
9. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904, 84 Stat. 922,
947 (1970) (“The provisions of this title [RICO] shall be liberally construed to
effectuate its remedial purposes.”); see, e.g., United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576,
580 (1981) (citing the liberal construction provision in finding “no restriction upon the
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This potential soon became a reality. From 2001 to 2006 alone,
civil RICO plaintiffs filed, on average, 759 private civil claims each
year. Although astonishing, these numbers are not anomalous given the
last two decades of RICO jurisprudence, 10 in whom a rising proportion
of claims are inapposite to the intentions of RICO’s drafters. 11
Ironically, actions often target legitimate corporate organizations, among
the parties whom RICO was designed to protect from mob infiltration. 12
Such claims seek to RICO-ize ordinary commercial activity and turn
garden-variety business disputes into federal claims for treble damages
and attorney’s fees. In one recent example, a professional wrestling
promoter sued the makers of action figures and video games and
licensing agents, alleging commercial bribery and related claims in
connection with licensing agreements. 13
Several courts have tried to limit RICO’s reach in response to the
exponential growth of civil RICO, seeking to prevent the “RICOiz[ation]” 14 of the law of corporations, business, or torts. Notably, the
Supreme Court limited section 1962(c) to claims based on a strict textual

associations embraced by the definition [of enterprise in 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4)]”).
Notably, Turkette overruled a First Circuit decision which limited RICO’s application
to “legitimate” enterprises, a restriction which had no textual basis. See infra notes 3839 and accompanying text.
10. See Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics, Table C-2: U.S. District Courts—
Civil Cases Commenced, by Basis of Jurisdiction and Nature of Suit, for 2001-2006,
respectively, http://www.uscourts.gov/caseloadstatistics.html (last visited Sept. 30,
2007) (detailing the number of cases commenced by type per year); see also William H.
Rehnquist, Reforming Rico, in THE RICO RACKET 63, 64 (Gary L. McDowell ed., 1989)
(“Civil filings under [RICO] have increased more than eight-fold over the last five years
to nearly a thousand cases during calendar year 1988.”).
11. Rehnquist, supra note 10, at 64 (“Most of the civil suits filed under the statute
have nothing to do with organized crime. They are garden-variety civil fraud cases of
the type traditionally litigated in state courts.”).
12. See, e.g., S. Rep. 91-617, at 76 (indicating Title IX [RICO] “has as its purpose
the elimination of the infiltration of organized crime and racketeering into legitimate
organizations operating in interstate commerce”).
13. World Wrestling Entm’t, Inc. v. Jakks Pac., Inc., 425 F. Supp. 2d 484
(S.D.N.Y. 2006).
14. See Transcript of Oral Argument, No. 05-465, 2006 WL 1194498, at *44, *56
(2006), Mohawk Indus., 126 S. Ct. 2016 (No. 05-465), available at http://www.supreme
courtus.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/05-465.pdf [hereinafter Mohawk
Indus. Transcript]. The term “RICO-ize” was apparently coined by Justice Breyer
during oral argument in Mohawk Industries, Inc. v. Williams, 126 S. Ct. 2016 (2006)
(per curiam) (dismissing certification as improvidently granted).
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analysis. The Court held that a RICO defendant must participate in the
RICO enterprise, not merely conduct its own affairs, to be liable under
section 1962(c). 15 More recently, the Court now requires that a RICO
defendant be distinct from the RICO enterprise. 16 In response, private
plaintiffs attempt to plead around the rule. Rather than allege that a
corporate defendant constitutes an entire enterprise, civil claimants
assert that such a defendant belongs to part of a larger group “associated
in fact.” 17 The Supreme Court considered this possibility in Kushner
and warned lower courts not to accept this species of evasive pleading. 18
Most circuits, however, have found that legal entities can be a part of
larger associations in fact. 19
15. Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 185 (1993) (“[L]iability depends on
showing that the defendants conducted or participated in the conduct of the
‘enterprise’s affairs,’ not just their own affairs. Of course, ‘outsiders’ may be liable
under § 1962(c) if they are ‘associated with’ an enterprise and participate in the conduct
of its affairs . . . .”). The Court began to replace its liberal construction of RICO with
the rule of lenity—a tool of construction appropriate for a quasi-criminal statute. See id.
at 183, 184 n.8.
16. See Cedric Kushner Promotions, Ltd. v. King, 533 U.S. 158, 162 (2001) (“We
do not quarrel with the basic principle that to establish liability under § 1962(c) one
must allege and prove the existence of two distinct entities: (1) a ‘person’; and (2) an
‘enterprise’ that is not simply the same ‘person’ referred to by a different name.”). The
Court accepted a slight distinction—between the corporate owner as natural person and
the corporation as legal person. See id. The case presented the archetypal RICO fact
pattern, an individual defendant using an enterprise for racketeering activity. Id. at 16162. This case laid the foundation for the current circuit split. See infra Part III.
17. Radionic Indus., Inc. v. GTE Prods. Corp., 665 F. Supp. 622, 628 (N.D. Ill.
1987) (arguing that such pleading is “essentially a linguistic maneuver designed to slip
around the [Haroco, Inc. v. Am. Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 747 F.2d 384 (7th Cir. 1984)]
decision [requiring defendant-enterprise distinction] and pin vicarious liability on a
deep pocket . . . .”). In short, plaintiffs want to be able to name the corporation as the
RICO defendant because of their finances. See Mark Stephen Poker, Reaching a Deep
Pocket Under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 72 MARQ. L.
REV. 511 (1989) (“[I]n a given case, the corporate defendant may be the only potential
defendant with the proverbial deep pocket.”). In order to do that, the distinctness
requirement forces plaintiffs to find some larger enterprise of which the defendant
corporation is a part. Alleging an ‘associated-in-fact’ enterprise allows a corporation to
be named as the defendant in addition to being part of the larger association-in-fact—it
is an escape hatch from the distinctness requirement.
18. Kushner, 533 U.S. at 164 (“It is less natural to speak of a corporation as
‘employed by’ or ‘associated with’ this latter oddly constructed entity.”).
19. See, e.g., United States v. London, 66 F.3d 1227, 1243 (1st Cir. 1995); Atlas
Pile Driving Co. v. DiCon Fin. Co., 886 F.2d 986, 995 (8th Cir. 1989); Fleischhauer v.
Feltner, 879 F.2d 1290, 1296-97 (6th Cir. 1989); United States v. Feldman, 853 F.3d
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This Article contends that a proper reading of the definition of
“associated-in-fact” enterprise returns RICO to its racketeering roots. In
light of the importance of the statutory definition of “enterprise,” its
language merits quotation in full: “‘enterprise’ includes any individual,
partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union
or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity.” 20
A close reading of the statute recognizes the difference between a
corporation and an individual, resulting in the conclusion that
corporations cannot be part of a “group of individuals associated in
fact.” The inclusion of “group of individuals” was designed to reach
associations of figures in an unrecognized criminal organization—not
legitimate corporations. 21 In other words, the correct reading of RICO
would return the statute to its original purpose of combating both the
civil and criminal dimensions of organized criminal activity.
Part I examines the interpretation of RICO as articulated in seminal
circuit precedents. These early cases relied on three principal bases for
their decisions. Part II returns to the language of the statute, applying
familiar tools of statutory interpretation that reveal the errors in the
reasoning of the circuits. The law that matters, however, is the law as
interpreted. So why, given the circuit consensus, does it matter if a
proper reading of the statute would protect corporations from the RICOization of general law? Part III responds to this question by pointing to
the opportunity for a rediscovery of this reasonable limitation on
RICO. 22

648, 655 (9th Cir. 1988); United States v. Perholtz, 842 F.2d 343, 353 (D.C. Cir. 1988);
United States v. Navarro-Ordas, 770 F.2d 959, 969 n.19 (11th Cir. 1985); Bunker Ramo
Corp. v. United Bus. Forms, Inc., 713 F.3d 1272, 1285 (7th Cir. 1983); United States v.
Aimone, 715 F.2d 822, 828 (3d Cir. 1983); United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 625
(Former 5th Cir. 1982); United States v. Huber, 603 F.2d 387, 394 (2d Cir. 1979).
20. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (2006); see generally George K. Chamberlin, Annotation,
What Is an “Enterprise,” as Defined at 18 U.S.C.A. § 1961(4), For Purposes of the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Statute (18 U.S.C.A. § 1961 et
seq.), 52 A.L.R. FED. 818 (1981 & Supp. 2007) (collecting and summarizing cases on
the definition of enterprise).
21. See infra notes 50-53 and accompanying text.
22. See Mohawk Indus. Transcript, supra note 14.
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I. UNIFORM ERROR: LEGAL ENTITIES, ASSOCIATED-IN-FACT
AND THE CIRCUITS
The expansive interpretation of RICO occurred primarily in federal
appeals courts during the 1980s. 23 The Supreme Court’s 2001 decision
in Kushner called into question the precedent set in that period. 24
Notably, six of the seven earliest appeals court cases stem from criminal
prosecutions, 25 where RICO’s application is ordinarily tempered by
regulatory oversight of the moving party (the government) and the
reluctance of courts to overturn convictions on technicalities. 26 The sole
civil case amounted to a recitation of two of the earlier criminal cases
and added no further analysis aside from supplementing the definition of
“enterprise” with language not found in the statute. 27
23. Cf. Feldman, 853 F.2d at 655-56; Perholtz, 842 F.2d at 353; Navarro-Ordas,
770 F.2d at 969 n.19; Aimone, 715 F.2d at 828; Bunker Ramo, 713 F.2d at 1285; Thevis,
665 F.2d at 625; Huber, 603 F.2d at 393-94.
24. Kushner, 533 U.S. at 164 (stating that an association of legal and natural
persons would be an “oddly constructed entity”).
25. Feldman, 853 F.2d 648 (Ninth Circuit); Perholtz, 842 F.2d 343 (District of
Columbia Circuit); Navarro-Ordas, 770 F.2d 959 (Eleventh Circuit); Aimone, 715 F.2d
822 (Third Circuit); Thevis, 665 F.2d 616 (Former Fifth Circuit); Huber, 603 F.2d 387
(Second Circuit). Bunker Ramo, 713 F.2d 1272 (Seventh Circuit) is the lone civil case
of the group.
26. Paul Edgar Harold, Quo Vadis, Association in Fact? The Growing Disparity
Between How Federal Courts Interpret Rico’s Enterprise Provision in Criminal and
Civil Cases (With a Little Statutory Background to Explain Why), 80 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 781, 782 (2005) (“Currently, federal courts evidence the judicial hostility to civil
RICO in particular through tightening their interpretation of what constitutes an
association-in-fact enterprise in the civil context, while concurrently unduly loosening
the previous restrictions on criminal association-in-fact enterprises.”); cf. Rehnquist,
supra note 10, at 65 (“[T]here is no such thing as prosecutorial discretion to limit the
use of civil RICO by plaintiffs’ attorneys. Any good lawyer who can bring himself
within the terms of the federal civil RICO provisions will sue in federal court . . . .”).
27. Bunker Ramo, 713 F.2d at 1285 (“‘Enterprise,’ the first crucial concept, is
defined as including ‘any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal
entity, . . . any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal
entity,’ 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4), and any combination of them.” (emphasis added) (citing
Thevis, 665 F.2d at 625; Huber, 603 F.2d at 393-94)). An Eleventh Circuit case
similarly changed the statutory language in a way that would reach corporations
associated in fact. See United States v. Hewes, 729 F.2d 1302, 1311 (11th Cir. 1984)
(“Our precedent indicates that a RICO enterprise exists where a group of persons
associates, formally or informally, with the purpose of conducting illegal activity . . . .”)
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Generally, three arguments typify circuit court RICO jurisprudence
in this time period: (1) since the word “includes” introduces the
definition of “enterprise,” 28 the list following “includes” is illustrative,
not exhaustive; 29 (2) an expansive reading of the statute comports with
Congress’s command of liberal interpretation; 30 and (3) “[t]here is no
restriction upon the associations embraced by the definition . . .” of
enterprise. 31
Congress stated that RICO “shall be liberally construed to
effectuate its remedial purposes.” 32 Several circuits took this to mean
that “the term ‘enterprise’ should be construed broadly to include an
association of legal entities.” 33 Any more “restrictive interpretation of
the definition of enterprise would contravene this principle of statutory

(emphasis added) (affirming conviction of a group of natural persons, or individuals).
28. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1970) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (2006)).
29. See Huber, 603 F.2d 387 (holding for the first time among the circuits that legal
entities can be part of ‘associations in fact’); see also United States v. London, 66 F.3d
1227, 1243 (1st Cir. 1995) (quoting Perholtz, 842 F.2d at 353); United States v.
Masters, 924 F.2d 1362, 1366 (7th Cir. 1991) (“The statute says “‘enterprise’ includes”not “‘enterprise’ means.” The point of the definition is to make clear that it need not be
a formal enterprise . . . .”); Atlas Pile Driving Co. v. DiCon Fin. Co., 886 F.2d 986, 995
n.7 (8th Cir. 1989) (relying on the other circuits while noting “the statute’s language is
illustrative, not exhaustive”); Perholtz, 842 F.2d at 353 (“The statute defines
‘enterprise’ as including the various entities specified; the list of entities is not meant to
be exhaustive.”); Aimone, 715 F.2d at 828 (“The court reasoned that Congress used the
word ‘includes’ in the enterprise definition to indicate a non-exhaustive listing of
associations and that a broad interpretation was intended.” (citing Thevis, 665 F.2d at
625)); Thevis 665 F.2d 616, 625 (“Use of the verb ‘includes’ in the statutory definition
indicates congressional intent not to limit a RICO enterprise to the specific categories
listed . . . .”). In other words, just because the statutory language does not mention legal
entities being associated in fact does not mean that they are not encompassed within the
definition’s ambit.
30. Pub. L. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 922, 947 (1970).
31. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580-81 (1981). These courts ignore
the second clause of the sentence, which clearly shows that the Turkette court was
focused on the limited issue of whether legitimate organizations could be RICO
enterprises. Cf. id.
32. Pub. L. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 922, 947 (1970).
33. United States v. Blinder, 10 F.3d 1468, 1473 (9th Cir. 1993).
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construction.” 34 The Supreme Court twice cited this provision while
striking down extra-textual restrictions of RICO. 35
In one of those cases, United States v. Turkette, 36 the Court reversed
a First Circuit decision that limited RICO to legitimate (i.e. noncriminal) organizations only. 37 In the process, the Court stated, “There
is no restriction upon the associations embraced by the definition: an
enterprise includes any union or group of individuals associated in fact.
On its face, the definition appears to include both legitimate and
illegitimate enterprises within its scope; it no more excludes criminal
enterprises than it does legitimate ones.” 38 Several circuits quote this
language selectively to conclude that there are no restrictions on the
associations that can constitute an enterprise. 39 Indeed, these courts
omit the latter part of this passage from Turkette, making it stand for the
much broader proposition that: “There is no restriction upon the
associations embraced by the definition . . . .” Read in context, the full
quote shows that the Court was focused on whether the language in the
definition of “enterprise” was restricted to criminal enterprises, and in
the course of that analysis the Court rejected a reading at odds with the
plain language.
The Fifth Circuit also relies on Turkette, though not the same
passage, to give breadth to RICO’s definition of enterprise. 40 The panel
34. Perholtz, 842 F.2d at 353; see also London, 66 F.3d at 1243 (quoting Perholtz,
842 F.2d at 353); Huber, 603 F.2d at 394 (“There is no reason to believe that Congress
cared what form such infiltration took . . . .”).
35. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 498 (1985) (“The statute’s
‘remedial purposes’ are nowhere more evident than in the provision of a private action
for those injured by racketeering activity. Far from effectuating these purposes, the
narrow readings offered by the dissenters and the court below would in effect eliminate
§ 1964(c) . . . .”) (internal citation omitted) (reversing the decision of the Second
Circuit, which had found a requirement that the RICO civil defendant already have been
convicted of a predicate act); Turkette, 452 U.S. at 587 (“With or without this
admonition, we could not agree with the Court of Appeals that illegitimate enterprises
should be excluded from coverage.”).
36. 452 U.S. 576 (1981).
37. See id. at 581.
38. Id. at 580-81.
39. London, 66 F.3d at 1243 (quoting Perholtz, 842 F.2d at 353); United States v.
Feldman, 853 F.2d 648, 655 (9th Cir. 1988); Perholtz, 842 F.2d at 353; United States v.
Aimone, 715 F.2d 822, 828 (3d Cir. 1983).
40. See United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 625 (Former 5th Cir. 1982) (“[T]he
language ‘reveals that Congress opted for a far broader definition of the word
‘enterprise.’” (quoting Turkette, 452 U.S. at 593)). The Fifth Circuit has nonetheless
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argued that the legislative history supports a broad reading of enterprise,
noting a passage in the House Report stating that the “infiltration of any
associative group by any individual or group . . . can be reached.” 41 It is
the only circuit to rely on legislative history. Five circuits rely
exclusively on the analysis from other circuits’ opinions. 42 Several
circuits performing their own analysis have examined some of the policy
consequences of excluding corporations from associations in fact. In the
words of the Eighth Circuit, “we think it unwise policy to permit
individuals to escape the reach of RICO through the simple artifice of
incorporation.” 43
Several district courts disagreed with the circuit consensus. In
Seville Industrial Machinery Corp. v. Southmost Machinery Corp., the
New Jersey District Court reasoned that the alleged enterprise of two
corporations and two individuals could not constitute a RICO enterprise
“[s]ince the combined entity is not a union and is not ‘associated

recognized limits on its broad reading; it has recognized that trusts cannot form all or
part of a RICO enterprise. See Bonner v. Henderson, 147 F.3d 457, 459-60 (5th Cir.
1998) (“A trust is neither a legal entity nor an association in fact. . . . An association-infact consists of personnel who share a common purpose and collectively form a
decision-making structure.” (emphasis added)).
41. Thevis, 665 F.2d at 625 (quoting H. Rep. 91-1549) (emphasis added). Identical
language appears in the Senate Report. See S. Rep. 91-617, at 58.
42. London, 66 F.3d at 1243-44 (citing, inter alia, United States v. Blinder, 10 F.3d
1468, 1473 (9th Cir. 1993) and Atlas Pile Driving Co. v. DiCon Fin. Co., 886 F.2d 986,
995 n. 7 (8th Cir. 1989) and quoting at length from Perholtz, 842 F.2d 343; Dana Corp.
v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield Mut., 900 F.2d 882, 887 (6th Cir. 1990) (citing Huber, 603
F.2d at 393-94); Fleischhauer v. Feltner, 879 F.2d 1290 (6th Cir. 1989) (citing Feldman,
853 F.2d at 655-56); Feldman, 853 F.2d at 655-56 (citing Turkette, Thevis, Aimone, and
Huber); United States v. Navarro-Ordas, 770 F.2d 959, 969 n.19 (11th Cir. 1985)
(citing Huber); Bunker Ramo Corp. v. United Bus. Forms, Inc., 713 F.2d 1272, 1285
(7th Cir. 1983) (citing Thevis and Huber).
43. Atlas Pile Driving Co., 886 F.2d at 995 n.7 (8th Cir. 1989); see also London, 66
F.3d at 1244 (quoting Perholtz, 842 F.2d at 353); United States v. Masters, 924 F.2d
1362, 1366 (7th Cir. 1991) (“Otherwise while three criminal gangs would each be a
RICO enterprise, a loose-knit merger of the three, in which each retained its separate
identity, would not be, because it would not be an association of individuals. That
would make no sense.”); Perholtz, 842 F.2d at 353 (“Appellants’ reading of section
1961(4) would lead to the bizarre result that only criminals who failed to form corporate
shells to aid their illicit schemes could be reached by RICO.”); Huber, 603 F.2d at 394
(“We agree with the government that appellant’s reading of the statute would perversely
insulate the most sophisticated racketeering combinations from RICO’s sanctions, the
precise opposite of Congress’s intentions.”).
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individuals’ . . . .” 44 To hold otherwise, the Seville court concluded,
would “effectively eliminate the enterprise element of RICO and
drastically expand federal jurisdiction over all business torts which
involve the use of the mails or telephones.” 45 Judge Niemeyer, while on
the District Court of Maryland, 46 agreed, holding that “[c]orporations
cannot under RICO associate in fact to constitute an enterprise.” 47 The
Eastern District of Arkansas analyzed Huber at length, disagreeing with
it and other cases: “What the Court failed to note is that the Act, with its
civil and criminal provisions, has both punitive and remedial purposes.
While Congress may instruct courts to give broad interpretations to civil
provisions, it cannot require courts to abandon” the rule of lenity. 48

44. 567 F. Supp. 1146, 1151 (D.C.N.J. 1983), rev’d on other grounds, 742 F.2d
786 (3d Cir. 1984). The Third Circuit held that the pleadings sufficiently alleged four
different enterprises, thus not reaching the question of whether the two corporations and
two individuals could constitute an association-in-fact. Seville Indus. Mach., 742 F.2d at
790.
45. Seville Indus. Mach., 567 F. Supp. at 1152.
46. Judge Niemeyer currently sits on the Fourth Circuit. U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit, http://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/judges.htm.
47. Benard v. Hoff, 727 F. Supp. 211, 215 (D. Md. 1989). The Eastern District of
Virginia disagreed with this opinion and declined to follow it. See Chisolm v. Charlie
Falk’s Auto Wholesale, Inc., 851 F. Supp. 739, 747 (E.D. Va. 1994), vacated on other
grounds sub nom. Chisolm v. TranSouth Fin. Corp., 95 F.3d 331 (4th Cir. 1996). The
court in Rodriguez v. Banco Central, 777 F. Supp. 1043, 1054 n.15 (D.P.R. 1991),
indicated its agreement in principle with Judge Niemeyer’s opinion in Benard.
Rodriguez, 777 F. Supp. at 1054 n.15 (“[W]e actually believe that Banco Central’s
position [that a corporation cannot be part of an association in fact] is a much sounder
reading of the statutory language, and seems not to be directly contradicted by any of
the legislative history surrounding passage of this section.”). However, the court
elected not to follow this theory because of the law of the case doctrine. Rodriguez, 777
F. Supp. at 1054 n.15.
48. United States v. McClendon, 712 F. Supp. 723, 729 (quoting United States v.
Mandel, 415 F. Supp. 997, 1022 (D. Md. 1976) (holding that the State of Maryland
cannot be an enterprise)).
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II. A RETURN TO PLAIN MEANING: “INDIVIDUALS,” “INCLUDING,” LENITY
49
AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
Despite their consensus, the precedent in the circuits is flawed. As
even its name suggests, the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act criminalizes the influencing or corruption of an
organization. 50 A more considered textual reading of the statutory
definition of enterprise would return RICO to what the legislature
intended—a weapon to be used against organized crime. It also would
reverse the growing trend of using the statute to federalize vast areas of
“garden variety” fraud, which exposes corporate defendants to punitive
treble damages for alleged torts committed during the course of ordinary
commercial activity.
RICO “has as its purpose the elimination of the infiltration of
organized crime and racketeering into legitimate organizations . . . . It
seeks to achieve this objective by the fashioning of new criminal and
civil remedies and investigative procedures.” 51 The inclusion of
associations-in-fact was intended to draw criminal syndicates and their
leaders within the statutory reach, not associations of legitimate

49. The two petitions for certiorari in Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Williams, briefs in
support and opposition thereto, and briefs of the parties and amici curiae for the granted
petition, No. 05-465, all offer different portions of the argument in this Part at length.
This Part reviews and expands upon the arguments contained in those documents.
Nonetheless, those materials provide an excellent extended discussion of the errors in
the circuits’ reasoning.
50. The name of a legislative act may be used to shed light on ambiguous words or
phrases. See Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen v. Balt. & Ohio R.R., 331 U.S. 519, 528-29 (1947)
(noting “the wise rule that the title of a statute and the heading of a section cannot limit
the plain meaning of the text. For interpretative purposes, they are of use only when
they shed light on some ambiguous word or phrase.” (citations omitted)).
51. S. Rep. 91-617, at 76 (stating the purpose of RICO); see also Organized Crime
Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, 923 (1970) (stating RICO’s
purpose “to seek the eradication of organized crime in the United States”); Sen. R. 91617, at 2 (“It is the purpose of this act to seek the eradication of organized crime in the
United States . . . by establishing new penal prohibitions, and by providing enhanced
sanctions and new remedies to deal with the unlawful activities of those engaged in
organized crime.”) (stating the overall purpose of the Organized Crime Control Act of
1970). Samuel Alito noted that the two aims of RICO are “to make it unlawful for
individuals to function as members of organized criminal groups” and “to stop
organized crime’s infiltration of legitimate businesses.” Alito, supra note 8, at 3-4
(emphasis added).
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businesses. 52 Congress, in fact, debated using a definition that
encompassed any form of combination, including corporations. 53 The
fact that Congress considered language that swept far more broadly and
rejected it reflects a considered legislative judgment that groups of
corporations associated-in-fact were beyond the statutory objectives and
reach of RICO. 54 Thus, the Fifth Circuit in Thevis misread the
legislative history of RICO. The text, structure, and history of RICO, as
well as application of familiar rules of statutory interpretation, all
reinforce the conclusion that corporations cannot be part of associationsin-fact.
The plain text of RICO’s definition of enterprise makes it clear by
use of the word “individual” that a corporation cannot be part of an
association-in-fact. 55 The circuits’ reliance on the word “includes” is
52. See Sen. R. 91-617, at 42. RICO was intended to reach the heads of mafia-type
organizations, as individuals, who often could not be convicted based on the criminal
actions of their subordinates. Clearly, such mafia “families” would be a group of
individuals associated-in-fact. This is clearly reflected in the RICO statute’s legislative
history. The Senate Report indicates “[o]rganized crime leaders moreover, have been
notoriously successful in escaping punishment . . . .” Id. It was further added “[w]here
an organization is acquired or run by defined racketeering methods, then the persons
involved can be legally separated from the organization . . . . Through this new
approach, it should be possible to remove the leaders of organized crime from their
sources of economic power.” Id. at 79-80 (emphases added). Additionally, the Report
indicates “[n]evertheless, it must be emphasized that . . . Title IX seeks essentially an
economic, not a punitive goal . . . . These provisions [the civil remedies] should
effectively remove the criminal figure from the particular corrupt organization.” Id. at
81-82 (emphases added). Note the use of the singular “organization” in the foregoing
statement. In passing RICO it was also noted “it is insufficient to merely remove and
imprison individual mob members. Title IX attacks the problem by providing a means
of wholesale removal of organized crime from our organizations.” 116 CONG. REC. 591,
591 (1970) (statement of Sen. McClennan introducing RICO). It was also explained
that Title IX (RICO) was “designed to remove the influence of organized crime from
legitimate business by attacking its property interests and by removing its members
from control of legitimate busines[s].” Id. at 602 (remarks of Sen. Hruska) (emphasis
added).
53. See S. 2187 § 3(2), 89th Cong. (1965) (defining organization as “any group,
society, confederation, or syndicate whose aims, objectives, and purposes” included
racketeering acts). This broader definition would have reached “any group,” including
a group that included corporations.
54. Cf. Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 378 n.13 (2000)
(“The fact that Congress repeatedly considered and rejected targeting a broader range of
conduct lends additional support to our view.”).
55. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (2006) (“‘[E]nterprise’ includes any individual,
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misplaced; Congress used that word in RICO, as it has in numerous
other statutes, to give an exhaustive definition. 56 Congress uses
“individual” to refer to a natural person, distinct from legal entities. In
the Dictionary Act, setting forth default statutory definitions, Congress
defined “person” to “include corporations . . . as well as individuals.” 57
If individuals included corporations, the listing of corporations
separately from individuals would have been superfluous. “It is a
cardinal principle of statutory construction that a statute ought, upon the
whole, to be so construed that, if it can be prevented, no clause,
sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant.” 58
The conclusion that a group of individuals cannot include
corporations is reinforced by other statutory definitions. The definition
of the term “organization” as used throughout title 18 of the United
States Code (in which RICO is codified), also distinguishes between
legal persons and individuals. 59 Congress uses “individual” as a
fundamental definitional term to refer to human beings. 60 Moreover, ten
separate public laws passed by the 89th, 90th and 91st Congresses (the
three immediately prior to the passage of RICO) used the word
“individual,” to denote a single human being as opposed to a legal
partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of
individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity.”).
56. See infra note 60.
57. 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2006) (emphasis added).
58. TRW, Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001) (quoting Duncan v. Walker, 533
U.S. 167, 174 (2001)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
59. 18 U.S.C. § 18 (2006) (“As used in this title, the term ‘organization’ means a
person other than an individual.”); see also id. § 225 (2006) (setting different maximum
fines depending on whether the defendant is an individual or organization). Compare
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines § 5E1.3 Application Notes (applying “only if the defendant
is an individual . . . .”), with id. § 8E1.1 (“This guideline applies if the defendant is an
organization. It does not apply if the defendant is an individual . . . .”), and id. § 8A1.2
(governing the sentencing of organizations).
60. At least 180 different federal statutes evidence the use of “individual,” as
distinct from “corporation,” to define terms such as “person.” See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. §
8471(4) (“[T]he term ‘person’ means an individual, partnership, joint venture,
corporation, mutual company, joint-stock company, trust, estate, unincorporated
organization, association, or labor organization.”); 11 U.S.C. § 101(41) (“The term
‘person’ includes individual, partnership, and corporation . . . .”); 26 U.S.C. §
7701(a)(1) (“The term ‘person’ shall be construed to mean and include an individual, a
trust, estate, partnership, association, company or corporation.”); 42 U.S.C. § 4601(5)
(“The term ‘person’ means any individual, partnership, corporation, or association.”)
(emphases added).
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entity. 61 These definitions comport with the ordinary, dictionary
meaning of individual—“a single human being as contrasted with a
social group or institution.” 62
RICO itself notes the distinction between individuals and legal
persons. 63 The definition of person, in section 1961(3) immediately
61. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 2116(b), Pub. L. 89-502, § 17, 80 Stat. 286 (1966) (“The
term ‘person’ means any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or any other
entity.”); 7 U.S.C. § 2250a, Pub. L. 89-106, § 1, 79 Stat. 431 (1965) (noting that
“appropriations of the Department of Agriculture may be expended for the erection of
buildings and other structures on land owned by States, counties, municipalities, or
other political subdivisions, corporations, or individuals . . . .”); 12 U.S.C.
§ 1701y(a)(6), Pub. L. 90-448, Title I, § 107, 82 Stat. 491 (1968) (“The Foundation is
authorized to receive donations and grants from individuals and from public and private
organizations, foundations, and agencies.”); 12 U.S.C. § 1701z-2(g), Pub. L. 91-609,
Title V, § 502, 84 Stat. 1784 (1970) (“The Secretary is authorized to request and receive
such information or data as he deems appropriate from private individuals and
organizations, and from public agencies.”); 12 U.S.C. § 1735g(a)(3), Pub. L. 89-117,
Title I, § 107(a)-(e), 79 Stat. 458 (1965) (using the term individual to define “distressed
mortgagor” as a natural person—a “serviceman”); 20 U.S.C. § 80g(a)(3), Pub. L. 90637, § 4, 82 Stat. 1358 (1968) (“obtain grants from, and make contracts with, State,
Federal, local, and private agencies, organizations, institutions, and individuals”
(emphasis added)); 20 U.S.C. § 85(b), Pub. L. 89-772, 80 Stat. 1322 (1966) (“The
Smithsonian Institution is authorized to accept the voluntary services of such
organizations, and the voluntary services of individuals, for the benefit of the National
Zoological Park.” (emphasis added)); 22 U.S.C. §§ 2764(a), (b), Pub. L. 90-629, § 24,
82 Stat. 1324 (1968) (“The President may guarantee any individual, corporation,
partnership, or other juridical entity doing business in the United States . . . .” (emphasis
added)); 23 U.S.C. § 404, Pub. L. 89-564, § 101, 80 Stat. 733 (1966) (“The appointed
members . . . shall be selected from among . . . other public and private agencies,
organizations, or groups demonstrating an active interest in highway safety, as well as
research scientists and other individuals who are expert in this field.” (emphases
added)). The tenth is the Higher Education Act of 1965, which has been largely
amended and superseded by the Higher Education Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. 99498, 100 Stat 1268 (1986), and other reauthorizations in 1972, 1976, 1980, 1992, 1998,
and 2006. The 1965 Act provided, in part, that “[p]ayments under this Act to any
individual or to any State or Federal agency, institution of higher education, or any
other organization . . . .” Pub. L. 89-329, § 802, 79 Stat. 1219 (1965) (emphases
added).
62. WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE 1152 (1969) (emphasis added); see also AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY
OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 670 (1969) (“A single human being considered separately
from his group or from society.”); BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 913 (4th ed. 1968) (“As a
noun, this term denotes a single person . . . and also, very commonly, a private or
natural person as distinguished from a partnership, corporation, or association . . . .”).
63. See United Sav. Ass’n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd., 484
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preceding the definition of enterprise in section 1961(4), defines
“person” as including “any individual or entity capable of holding a
legal or beneficial interest in property.” 64 Further, the definition of
enterprise itself reveals that Congress knew the two terms were
different. The first part of the definition states that it includes
“individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal
entity.” 65 If “individual” included all the legal persons that followed,
their inclusion in the statute would be redundant. The statutory canon
that no words are insignificant points to the conclusion that RICO uses
the term “individuals” as distinct from corporations. 66 The rule that
identical words should be given consistent meaning throughout a statute
dictates that the term “individuals” as used in the second part of the
definition of enterprise—a “group of individuals associated in fact
although not a legal entity”—should have the same meaning as used in
the first part and section 1961(3). 67 The emphasized text in the statute
further urges this conclusion.
The fact that the first part of the definition of “enterprise” includes
both individuals and corporations while the second only lists
individuals, gives rise to the “sensible inference that the term left out
must have been meant to be excluded.” 68 This sensible inference is
embodied in the canon of statutory interpretation expressio unius est
exclusio alterius, which has been applied by the Court in analyzing

U.S. 365, 371 (1988) (“A provision that may seem ambiguous in isolation is often
clarified by the remainder of the statutory scheme-because the same terminology is used
elsewhere in a context that makes its meaning clear . . . .”).
64. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(3) (2006) (emphasis added).
65. Id. § 1961(4).
66. See Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 428-29 (1998). This is the
only Supreme Court case to define ‘individuals’ more broadly. The Court reached that
conclusion because to read individual otherwise “would produce an absurd and unjust
result which Congress could not have intended.” Id. at 429 (quoting Griffin v. Oceanic
Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 574 (1982)). No such “absurd” result obtains here:
reading individual in its ordinary sense would actually return RICO to Congress’s
intended purview.
67. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (2006) (emphasis added). “It is a normal rule of statutory
construction . . . that identical words used in different parts of the same act are intended
to have the same meaning . . . .” Comm’r v. Keystone Consol. Indus., Inc., 508 U.S.
152, 159 (1993) (citations and internal quotations omitted).
68. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73, 81 (2002) (refusing to apply
this inference because of the broad, expansive language used within the definition, as
opposed to introducing it).
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RICO provisions. 69 The application of this maxim is buttressed by the
fact that when Congress wants to define “enterprise” to include a group
of legal entities, it has done so explicitly. 70 This comparison shows that
Congress meant what it said when it restricted associations in fact to
those groups that were “not a legal entity.” 71 Tellingly, in its amicus
brief in Mohawk Industries, the United States conceded that a
corporation was not an individual under section 1961(4). 72 If a
corporation or other legal entity cannot be an individual, they also
cannot form part of an association-in-fact because they cannot be part of
a “union or group of individuals.”

69. Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983) (“[Where] Congress includes
particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same
Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the
disparate inclusion or exclusion.” (internal quotations omitted) (quoting United States v.
Wong Kim Bo, 472 F.2d 720, 722 (5th Cir. 1972)) (applying this maxim to 18 U.S.C. §
1963(a)(1), finding no restriction as opposed to § 1963(a)(2))); see generally 2A
NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47:23
(6th ed. 2005).
70. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 203(r)(1) (2006) (“‘Enterprise’ means the related
activities performed (either through unified operation or common control) by any
person or persons for a common business purpose, and includes all such activities
whether performed in one or more establishments or by one or more corporate or other
organizational units . . . .” (emphases added)). “[T]his provision shows that Congress
knew how to draft a [definition] when it wanted to.” City of Chicago v. Envtl. Def.
Fund, 511 U.S. 328, 338 (1994) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Indeed, as
the legislative history discussed supra at note 51 shows, Congress did consider several
broader definitions of enterprise in RICO but finally settled on the current text, a
process demonstrating their considered judgment.
71. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4). This last provision prevents the application of the
statutory canon ejusdem generis. The first part of § 1961(4)’s definition of enterprise
contains a catch-all provision, “other legal entity,” whereas the second clearly does not,
and in fact excludes legal entities with this provision. Compare “any individual,
partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity,” with “any union or group of
individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity.” The second section of the
definition therefore was intentionally drafted more narrowly to catch only mafia-type
organizations. See supra note 51.
72. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 6,
Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Williams, 546 U.S. 1075 (2005) (No. 05-465), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/osg/briefs/2005/3mer/1ami/2005-0465.mer.ami.pdf (“Petitioner
contends (Br. 12-26) that, because a corporation is not an ‘individual’ within the
meaning of Section 1961(4), an association in fact of which a corporation is a
constituent member cannot be a RICO ‘enterprise.’ Although petitioner’s premise is
correct . . . .”).
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The United States sought to avoid this conclusion, despite its
concession that corporations are not individuals, by relying on the use of
the word “includes” at the start of the definition. 73 This reliance is
misplaced; the dictionary definition of “include” specifies that it “does
not rule out the possibility of a complete listing.” 74 The Supreme Court
itself recognized that “includes” or “including” can be used to introduce
exhaustive definitions as well as exemplary lists. 75 Indeed, the Court
treats other such definitions within the RICO statute as comprehensive,
despite being introduced by “includes.” 76 It has also twice struck down
judicial limitations on the definition of a RICO enterprise, both of which
could follow logically from the text, on the grounds that the plain text is
exhaustive. 77

73. Id. (“Section 1961(4), which is introduced by the word ‘includes,’ neither
provides an exhaustive roster of the ‘enterprise[s]’ covered by RICO nor excludes a de
facto alliance that would constitute an ‘enterprise’ under the usual understanding of that
term.”).
74. AMERICAN HERITAGE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 701 (4th ed. 2001); see also
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 665 (1970) (noting that
include can “impl[y] that all of the components are stated”); BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
905 (4th ed. 1968) (defining include as “to confine within, . . . comprise, comprehend . .
. .”). The contemporary edition of Black’s Law Dictionary notes that “[i]ncluding may,
according to context, express an enlargement and have the meaning of and or in
addition to, or merely specify a particular thing already included within the general
words theretofore used.” Id. (underlining added, italics in original).
75. See, e.g., Helvering v. Morgan’s, Inc., 293 U.S. 121, 125 (1934) (“It may be
admitted that the term “includes” may sometimes be taken as synonymous with
‘means,’ . . . .”); Montello Salt Co. v. Utah, 221 U.S. 452, 466 (1911) (“The court also
considered that the word “including” was used as a word of enlargement, the learned
court being of opinion that such was its ordinary sense. With this we cannot concur. It
is its exceptional sense, as the dictionaries and cases indicate.”); see also Dong v.
Smithsonian Inst., 125 F.3d 877, 880 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (finding that “includes”
introduced a comprehensive definition); Willheim v. Murchison, 342 F.2d 33, 42 (2d
Cir. 1965) (Friendly, J.) (“Definitions in securities and other legislation often use the
word ‘include’ out of abundant caution . . . . But that does not afford carte blanche to
‘include’ transactions, neither expressly mentioned nor within the normal meaning of
the language, simply because a court may think this a good idea.”). But see, e.g., Am.
Surety Co. v. Marotta, 287 U.S. 513, 517 (1933) (noting that, in statutory definitions,
“‘include’ is frequently, if not generally, used as a word of extension or enlargement
rather than as one of limitation or enumeration.” (emphasis added)).
76. See United States v. Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600, 607 (1989) (holding that 21
U.S.C. § 853(b), which had the exact same wording as 18 U.S.C. § 1963(b), including
“includes,” to be an “all-inclusive listing”).
77. See Nat’l Org. for Women v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249, 254 (1994) (striking
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Understanding the use of “includes” as exhaustive also follows
from the text and structure of RICO’s statutory scheme. 78 Three other
provisions within section 1961 use “includes” to begin their definition,
and each is unquestionably exhaustive. Section 1961(3) defines person
to include “any individual or entity capable of holding a legal or
beneficial interest in property.” 79 No court has suggested that this
definition is not exhaustive. Sections 1961(9) and (10) conclude their
definitions with catch-all provisions, such that these sections must, of
necessity, be exhaustive. 80 When Congress wanted a definition in RICO
to be exemplary and not exhaustive, it clearly stated that the definition
was “including, but not limited to” the statutory text. 81 “Includes” in
section 1961(4) should be given the same exhaustive meaning as it has
in other parts of the same statute, much like the meaning of
“individuals” should remain constant. Therefore, the circuits’ attempts

down a limitation to economic enterprises); United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576,
580-81 (1981) (striking down a limitation to legitimate enterprises). The second part of
the sentence in Turkette, always truncated when cited by the circuits as noted supra in
Part I, requires a return to the strict textual definition of enterprise.
There is no restriction upon the associations embraced by the definition: an enterprise
includes any union or group of individuals associated in fact. On its face, the
definition appears to include both legitimate and illegitimate enterprises within its
scope; it no more excludes criminal enterprises than it does legitimate ones.

452 U.S. at 580-81. When thus put in context, the Turkette quote actually supports
treating the definition of enterprise as comprehensive and eliminating corporations or
other legal entities from associations in fact. Cf. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.)
264, 399 (1821) (Marshall, C.J.) (“It is a maxim not to be disregarded, that general
expressions, in every opinion, are to be taken in connection with the case in which those
expressions are used.”).
78. See United Sav. Ass’n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd., 484
U.S. 365, 371 (1988) (“A provision that may seem ambiguous in isolation is often
clarified by the remainder of the statutory scheme -- because the same terminology is
used elsewhere in a context that makes its meaning clear . . . .”).
79. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(3).
80. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(9) (“or other material”); id. § 1961(10) (“or any
employee of the Department of Justice or any employee of any department or agency of
the United States so designated by the Attorney General”).
81. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(b) (repealed by Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 302, 98 Stat. 1837,
2040 (1984)); id. at § 1964(a) (twice); see also S. Rep. 91-617, at 160 (“Although
certain remedies are set out, the list is not exhaustive . . . .”). This is the only reference
to illustrative and not exhaustive definitions in the Senate Report. The legislative
history of § 1964(a) thus confirms that Congress used “including, but not limited to” in
RICO when it wanted an illustrative definition.
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to broaden the definition of “enterprise” beyond what is contained in the
statute are unsupported by the use of the word “includes.”
Nor does the statutory mandate for broad construction support the
circuits’ reading of section 1961. “Congress’s call for a liberal
interpretation in order to effectuate the Act’s ‘remedial purposes’ does
not outweigh the Court’s duty under the ‘rule of lenity’ to construe
criminal statutes strictly.” 82 The rule of lenity “ensures fair warning by
so resolving any ambiguity in a criminal statute as to apply it only to
conduct clearly covered.” 83 Although the rule has its roots in the
criminal law notion of fair warning, it applies to statutes which have
both civil and criminal applications. 84 Indeed, the Court has specifically
held that the rule of lenity applies to sections 1961 and 1962 of RICO.
“But even if [the rule of lenity] has some application, it does not support
the court’s holding. The strict-and liberal-construction principles are not
mutually exclusive; [section] 1961 and [section] 1962 can be strictly
construed without adopting that approach to [section] 1964(c).” 85
Indeed, the legislative history of the liberal construction clause supports

82. United States v. McClendon, 712 F. Supp. 723, 729 (E.D. Ark. 1988); see also
Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 183 (1993) (The liberal construction clause “is
not an invitation to apply RICO to new purposes that Congress never intended.”).
83. United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 266 (1997); see also United States v.
Granderson, 511 U.S. 39, 54 (1994) (“In these circumstances-where text, structure, and
history fail to establish that the Government’s position is unambiguously correct-we
apply the rule of lenity and resolve the ambiguity in [the defendant’s] favor.”) (defining
the rule and its applicability).
84. See, e.g., Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 11 n.8 (2004) (“Although here we
deal with § 16 in the deportation context, § 16 is a criminal statute, and it has both
criminal and noncriminal applications. Because we must interpret the statute
consistently, whether we encounter its application in a criminal or noncriminal context,
the rule of lenity applies.”); United States v. Thompson/Ctr. Arms Co., 504 U.S. 505,
517-18 (1992) (plurality opinion)
The key to resolving the ambiguity lies in recognizing that although it is a tax statute
that we construe now in a civil setting, the NFA has criminal applications that carry
no additional requirement of willfulness. . . . It is proper, therefore, to apply the rule of
lenity and resolve the ambiguity in Thompson/Center’s favor.

(internal citations and quotations omitted); Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 168
(1990) (applying the rule of lenity to a criminal statute in a civil action).
85. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 491 n.10 (1985) (rejecting a prior
criminal conviction requirement); see also H.J., Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229,
255 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“RICO, since it has criminal applications as well,
must, even in its civil applications, possess the degree of certainty required for criminal
laws . . . .”).
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the conclusion that it was meant to apply only to section 1964. 86
Following the Court’s command to apply the rule of lenity, section
1961(4) must be given a narrow reading so that defendants have fair
warning that their actions may conflict with the law. The very difficulty
of identifying associations-in-fact urges that the statute be construed
narrowly. 87 If the text and structure of the statute are ambiguous, the
rule of lenity requires that courts not include legal entities within
associations-in-fact.
Finally, the policy reasoning of the circuits is both inappropriate
and incorrect. Policy choices are appropriately left to Congress, and not
the courts, which must confine themselves to interpreting the statutory
language. “Our individual appraisal of the wisdom or unwisdom [sic] of
a particular course consciously selected by the Congress is to be put
aside in the process of interpreting a statute. Once the meaning of an
enactment is discerned and its constitutionality determined, the judicial
process comes to an end.” 88 Notwithstanding the inapplicability of the
statute, concern that individuals would be able to avoid RICO by
incorporating is simply misplaced. The definition of “enterprise”
expressly provides that corporations, standing alone, can be RICO
enterprises; RICO therefore does reach the sophisticated racketeer who
forms a corporate shell in his or her individual capacity. 89 Indeed, that
was precisely the result in Kushner, in which the defendant individual
86. See S. Rep. No. 91-617, at 160 (1969) (“Subsection (a) contains broad remedial
provisions for reform of corrupted organizations. . . . . Because the action is remedial,
not punitive . . . .”). Section 1964 is the only part of the Act which the Senate describes
as having remedial purposes. As the justification for liberal construction relied on the
Act’s ‘remedial purposes,’ this is the only section where it would apply. Note as well
that here, where Congress intended for the definition to be illustrative, it used the term
“including, but not limited to,” rather than merely “includes.”
87. See Bennett v. Berg, 685 F.2d 1053, 1060 (8th Cir. 1982) (“An enterprise is
particularly likely to be found where . . . the enterprise alleged is a legal entity rather
than an ‘associational enterprise.’”). As the latter part of this quotation suggests,
associations-in-fact are understandably more difficult to delineate. See the discussion
of how circuits have split over the requisite attributes of associations-in-fact, infra notes
116-26 and accompanying text.
88. TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194 (1978); cf. supra note 43, (noting the circuit’s
use of the words ‘unwise,’ ‘bizarre,’ ‘policy,’ ‘perversely,’ and ‘no sense’ to justify
their holdings).
89. In other words, the individual could be liable for controlling an enterprise
corporation through a pattern of racketeering. This answers the concerns raised by
those circuits that engaged in outcome oriented reasoning. See supra note 43 and
accompanying text.
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was held to be distinct from the RICO enterprise—his wholly owned
corporation. 90
From a policy perspective, the goal of reasonably limiting the
statute’s use against legitimate corporations is best served by a narrow
reading. Construing “group of individuals” to include both legal and
natural persons creates unbounded liability potential under RICO. 91
Under such a construction, a RICO “enterprise” could be nothing more
than two businesses that enter into a joint marketing agreement, as
demonstrated by the recent Ninth Circuit opinion Odom v. Microsoft
Corporation. 92 Plaintiff Odom had alleged that Microsoft and Best Buy
formed an association-in-fact enterprise by virtue of an agreement that
Microsoft would promote Best Buy’s online store through its MSN
service. 93 Odom alleged wire fraud, claiming that Microsoft and Best
Buy misrepresented that his credit card eventually would be billed for
internet service included with the laptop he purchased. 94
Odom illustrates how plaintiffs can elevate ordinary commercial
torts like fraud to the level of racketeering activity simply by pleading a
RICO claim based upon an association-in-fact enterprise. 95 Under
Odom’s reasoning, virtually any two businesses in a joint venture would
be associated-in-fact and potentially exposed to fraud-based RICO
litigation. 96 Given the threat of treble damages and attorneys’ fees

90.
91.

Cedric Kushner Promotions, Ltd. v. King, 533 U.S. 158, 163 (2001).
See, e.g., Bruns v. Ledbetter, 583 F. Supp. 1050, 1055 (S.D. Cal. 1984) (noting
that, were RICO to be read broadly, it “would literally make a federal case out of nearly
every instance of business fraud”).
92. 486 F.3d 541 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc), cert. denied, 76 U.S.L.W. 3199 (2007).
93. Id. at 543.
94. See id. at 543-45. The district court had dismissed for, inter alia, failure to
allege a proper association-in-fact enterprise. Id. In a 6-5 decision, the en banc panel
reversed. Id. at 543. The majority opinion assumed, without discussion, that “a
corporation can be an ‘individual’ for purposes of an associated-in-fact enterprise.” Id.
at 548. It joined the First, Eleventh, Second and D.C. Circuits by holding that “an
associated-in-fact enterprise under RICO does not require any particular organizational
structure, separate or otherwise.” Id. at 551.
95. See Fitzgerald v. Chrysler Corp., 116 F.3d 225, 226 (7th Cir. 1997) (“Read
literally, RICO would encompass every fraud case against a corporation, provided only
that a pattern of fraud and some use of the mails or of telecommunications to further the
fraud were shown . . . .”).
96. Odom, 486 F.3d at 552-53. The Odom majority found the threefold criteria for
an associated-in-fact enterprise set forth in Turkette—a common purpose, an ongoing
organization, and evidence of function as a continuing unit—satisfied by allegations of
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carried by a RICO judgment, the exposure to RICO litigation created by
Odom’s expansive understanding of associations-in-fact discourages
legitimate, consumer-friendly business ventures.
Without any
reasonable limitation on what may constitute an associated-in-fact
enterprise, RICO essentially becomes a vehicle for seeking punitive
damages in federal courts for garden-variety civil fraud, which
unnecessarily expends judicial and economic resources. 97 Construing
“group of individuals” as this Article contends would drastically reduce
the quantity of fraud-based civil RICO suits against legitimate
businesses.
III. THE CURRENT OPPORTUNITY FOR RICO REFORM IN THE
SUPREME COURT
Despite the textual and legislative arguments discussed above, it
seems settled among the circuits that associations-in-fact may be formed
by any combination of entities.
Ordinarily, that the circuits’
interpretation of “association-in-fact” is erroneous is, at best, cold
comfort to corporations; the relevant law is the law as it is interpreted.
A majority of the current Supreme Court, however, recently offered a
different take on the question of whether legal entities could be part of
an association-in-fact. 98 During oral arguments in Mohawk Industries,
Inc. v. Williams, 99 the questioning by several justices indicated a
Microsoft and Best Buy’s concerted action in implementing their joint-marketing
agreement.
97. See Rehnquist, supra note 10, at 64 (observing that “[m]ost of the civil suits
filed under the statute have nothing to do with organized crime. They are gardenvariety civil fraud cases of the type traditionally litigated in state courts”).
98. A Justice’s questioning, of course, should not be taken as signifying a settled
opinion. Nonetheless, “by keeping track of the number of questions each Justice asks,
and by evaluating the relative content of those questions, one can actually predict before
the argument is over which way each Justice will vote.” Sarah Levien Shullman, The
Illusion of Devil’s Advocacy: How the Justices of the Supreme Court Foreshadow Their
Decisions During Oral Argument, 6 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 271, 272 (2004). But see
Rex. E. Lee, Oral Argument in the Supreme Court, 72 A.B.A. J. 60, 60 (1986) (“It
should not be inferred, however, that comments in oral argument always reflect the
justices’ views. In the case of some members of the present Court [1986], what you see
and hear at oral argument is what you get at the conference vote. In other cases, it is
not”). While this Article does not take the position that a return to RICO’s text is a
forgone conclusion, the Justices’ questioning does suggest that it is more than a mere
fleeting possibility if the right case comes before the Court.
99. See Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Willliams, 126 S. Ct. 2016, 2016 (2006).
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willingness to revisit the settled circuit consensus. 100 Only seven
justices asked questions; Justices Stevens and Thomas did not speak at
all. Of these seven, only Justice Ginsburg appeared to support the
conclusion reached by the circuit courts. 101
Three of the justices highlighted the difference between RICO’s use
of individual and corporation. Chief Justice Roberts stated, “it does
seem kind of strange to encompass [corporations] under the term
individuals when the same statute uses individuals and corporations
separately.” 102 Later, he repeated that, “whatever an individual is it’s
different than a corporation or they wouldn’t have had to say corporation
again.” 103 Justice Kennedy followed this question, noting that “[t]his
says ‘individual’. A ‘person’ is defined in – in sub (3) just above it. A
‘person’ includes any individual or entity. Then the next thing says
‘individual’. So it’s not a – it doesn’t sound like a corporation.” 104
100.
101.

See Mohawk Indus. Transcript, supra note 14.
See id. at *6-9, *33 (focusing on the procedural posture of the case, Justice
Ginsburg stated, “[the Supreme] Court is a court of review, and to take a question that
was never certified, even to the court of appeals, to have the Court address it seems to
me very strange. It seems to me to erode rather starkly the final judgment rule, which
we don’t have here.”). When she did address the question of whether legal entities
could be part of an association-in-fact, however, Justice Ginsburg suggested that,
because partnerships were entities comprised of an association of individuals,
corporations could be covered within groups of individuals associated in fact. Id. at
*12-14. She stated, “[T]hat’s why I’m asking you about the partnership because it’s an
association of individuals. . . . No partnership could be treated just like a corporation.
They’re not an individual? Or partnerships are okay because there’s not a separate
entity. It’s a – it’s a association of individuals.” Id. at *13-14. Carter Phillips of Sidley
Austin, counsel for the corporation, ably responded to this concern, noting that an
action against the partnership itself would be an action against an entity, but “if you’re
trying to take the partnership and tag it to another group of rag-tag individuals, that
would not be an enterprise in fact because that’s not an – an association of individuals.
It’s a partnership which has an entity apart from the individuals.” Id. at *14.
102. Id. at *29.
103. Id. at *31.
104. Id. at *32 (internal quotes added). Before joining the Court, Justice Kennedy
also expressed some hesitance about civil RICO’s broad reach. See Schreiber Distrib.
Co. v. Serv-Well Furniture Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 1402 (9th Cir. 1986) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (noting that the broad reach of the federal mail and wire fraud statutes
“exists against a backdrop of prosecutorial discretion . . . . No such check operates in
the civil realm. . . . It is most unlikely that Congress envisaged use of the RICO statute
in a case such as the one before us, but we are required to follow where the words of the
statute lead . . . .”). Taken together with this question, Justice Kennedy appears
committed to limiting civil RICO to what the words of the statute allow.
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Immediately preceding Chief Justice Roberts’ questioning, Justice
Scalia weighed in, noting that the statute required “[a] union of
individuals or a group of individuals. You’re stuck with individuals. . . .
Then – then it means a union or group of individuals. . . . Right. So, you
know, you’re just as bad off.” 105 Three of the Justices, therefore,
seemed to base their position in part on the differentiation between
individuals and corporations throughout RICO’s definitional sections. If
a corporation or other legal entity cannot be an individual, they also
cannot form part of an association-in-fact because they cannot be part of
a “union or group of individuals.”
Another three Justices, including Justice Scalia, also based their
opinion on the fact that “includes,” as used by section 1961(4), presents
an exhaustive definition of enterprise. Justice Alito began this line of
thought, asking “[w]hy shouldn’t ‘includes’ here be read to mean
‘means’ when that seems to be the way it’s used in other subsections of
this provision . . . .” 106 Following up, Justice Scalia asked if any of the
cases which read “includes” as merely illustrative “have in third
sections, includes, comma, without limitation, comma.” 107 Upon
hearing that they did not, Justice Scalia said “I think that’s a big
difference.” 108 Finally, although Justice Souter appeared prepared to
permit the case to advance beyond a motion to dismiss, 109 he also
expressed skepticism about the circuits’ interpretation. He asked if the
circuits’ opinions dealt with the oddity of the definition “in which,
although it starts out with the word includes, then follows a – a listing,
A, B, C, and D, and then it repeats one, but only one, of the items on the
list and says groups of these items, i.e., individuals, are included?”110
This questioning suggests that the Court would take a hard look at the
circuits’ reading of “includes” as non-exhaustive and might reject it as a
basis for finding corporations can form associations-in-fact.

105.
106.

Mohawk Indus. Transcript, supra note 14, at *30-31.
Id. at *42; see also id. at *29-30 (“Well, do you agree that that’s an exhaustive
list in subsection (4)? . . . Well, would you agree that includes is meant to be exhaustive
in many of the other – in a number of the other subsections of this definitional
provision?”).
107. Id. at *42.
108. Id. at *42-43.
109. See id. at *18-19 (“Doesn’t – doesn’t that get them at least to – through the
motion to dismiss, and doesn’t it at least get them to summary judgment?”).
110. Id. at *51.
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The oral argument barely addressed the rule of lenity and RICO’s
legislative history. Justice Scalia was the only member of the Court to
mention the rule of lenity. He asked Assistant Solicitor General Stewart
why the Court shouldn’t “apply the rule that we normally apply with
regard to criminal statutes that where there is an ambiguity, the rule of
lenity applies and we shouldn’t give the – the Government license to –
to ride closer herd than – than is clear in the statute?”111 As for
legislative history, only the Chief Justice and Justice Breyer mentioned
it at oral argument. 112 The Chief Justice stated that “Congress did not
enact RICO because it was concerned that criminal conspiracy law,
applied to corporations, didn’t adequately touch interstate commerce.
The whole point is that they had something significantly different in
mind . . . .” 113
Justice Breyer explained his own reasoning on the definitional issue
at length, noting inter alia, that, “it’s possible that Congress was worried
about organized crime taking over the pizza parlor . . . . [T]hey had no
reason whatsoever for doing the same thing [with associations of
corporations] . . . .” 114 He continued to note that “to do that, adding
[groups of corporations] in when it doesn’t say that, would RICO-ize,
with its treble damages and private plaintiffs and everything, vast
amounts of ordinary commercial activity . . . . But Congress wouldn’t
have wanted to – that has not [sic] to do with organized crime.” 115 He
concluded, stating “[t]hey’re worried about groups of individuals.
They’re not worried about groups of corporations or groups of trade
unions interacting with each other.” 116
Thus, six Justices seemed receptive to the argument that
corporations could not be part of a group of individuals associated-infact, and a seventh, Justice Thomas, might well be sympathetic to the
views they expressed. 117 Justice Stevens, although less predictable than
111.
112.

Id. at *47.
See Alito, supra note 8, at 3-4 (noting the two aims of RICO—“to make it
unlawful for individuals to function as members of organized criminal groups” and “to
stop organized crime’s infiltration of legitimate business”)
113. Mohawk Indus. Transcript, supra note 14, at *36.
114. Id. at *44.
115. Id. at *44-45.
116. Id. at *45.
117. See generally H. Brent McKnight, The Emerging Contours of Justice Thomas’s
Textualism, 12 REGENT U. L. REV. 365, 366, 368, 371 (1999-2000). “The text is his
lodestar.” Id. at 366. “Rejecting legislative history and sources outside the statutory
text, Justice Thomas relies on canons of construction to resolve statutory ambiguity.”
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Justice Thomas, also may be inclined to agree. 118 Instead, however, the
Court chose to dismiss certiorari as improvidently granted and remand
the case. 119 Getting a similar case before the Justices may be difficult in
Id. at 368. “Justice Thomas avoids interpreting ambiguities to render statutory language
superfluous.” Id. at 371. Justice Thomas himself has said as much. Clarence Thomas,
Judging, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 6 (1996) (“[A]s judges we cannot use ambiguity as a
license to project our modern theories and preconceptions upon the Constitution.
Rather, we must strive to operate, even in those areas of ambiguity or unclarity, with
principles and with rules; otherwise the results in federal cases would still reduce to
personal preferences.”). Applying this jurisprudence to § 1961(4), Justice Thomas
seems likely to stick to the statutory language and follow the canons in their application,
detailed supra Part II, to conclude that corporations cannot be a part of a group of
individuals associated-in-fact. Furthermore, Justice Thomas has written about the abuse
of civil RICO and the need to limit the statute to Congress’s concern with organized
crime. See Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 126 S. Ct. 1991, 2004-05 (2006) (Thomas,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). “Given the distance the facts of this case
lie from the prototypical organized criminal activity that lead to RICO’s enactment, it is
tempting to find in the Act a limitation that will keep at least this and similar cases out
of court.” Id. at 2005 (declining to join the majority because it would also eliminate
those cases “that were at the core of Congress’ concern . . . .”).
118. See Diane L. Hughes, Note, Justice Stevens’ Method of Statutory
Interpretation: A Well-Tailored Means for Facilitating Environmental Regulation, 19
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 493, 493 (1995) (“Justice John Paul Stevens is sometimes
described as a maverick, a wild card, or a loner for his refusal to align himself with
either the conservative or the liberal factions on the Supreme Court. . . . [His
jurisprudence reflects a] unique, fact-specific approach . . . .” (footnotes omitted)). His
method of statutory interpretation focuses primarily on a statute’s purpose. See, e.g.,
John F. Manning, Competing Presumptions about Statutory Coherence, 74 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2009, 2049 (2006) (“At present, Justice Stevens is the only member of the
Supreme Court who openly subscribes to the strong form of purposivism associated
with the Court’s landmark decision in Holy Trinity.”); Hughes, supra, at 494
(“Although Justice Stevens exercises a less deferential and more active judicial role
when individual dignity rights are in question, in cases involving statutory
interpretation, where such concerns are not raised, he crafts decisions with narrow
applicability that accurately reflect the policy objectives advanced by legislative and
executive institutions.” (footnotes omitted)); see generally Robin Kundis Craig, The
Stevens/Scalia Principle and Why it Matters: Statutory Conversations and a Cultural
Critical Critique of the Strict Plain Meaning Approach, 79 TUL. L. REV. 955 (2005)
(comparing Justice Scalia’s strict plain meaning approach with Justice Stevens’ use of
the legislative purpose). As the detailed examination of the legislative history of RICO
shows, supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text, the main purpose of the statute was
to eliminate organized crime’s influence on legitimate business. Therefore, Justice
Stevens might be convinced to interpret the statute consistent with that purpose.
119. Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Williams, 126 S. Ct. 2016 (2006). After deciding Anza
v. Idea Steel Supply Corp., 126 S. Ct. 1991 (2006), the Court dismissed its partial grant
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the absence of a current circuit split and a general reluctance to overturn
what has become settled law. 120 Indeed, the Court rejected a second
petition for certiorari after remand in Mohawk Industries. 121
The Court is far more likely to grant certiorari if a circuit split
arises. 122
Two circuits have yet to expressly decide whether
corporations can be part of associated-in-fact enterprises and thus could
create a split on the direct issue. The Tenth Circuit has never confronted
this issue with regard to the federal RICO statute, but concluded that the
Colorado state RICO statute, with similar language, 123 allowed for
corporations to be part of an association-in-fact. 124 Some early Fourth
Circuit precedents suggested that its view was that corporations cannot
be part of associated-in-fact enterprises. 125 Yet, that court upheld

of certiorari as improvidently granted, granting certiorari without limitation, vacating
the lower court ruling and remanding the case to the Eleventh Circuit for
reconsideration in light of the Anza decision. Id.
120. See Sup. Ct. R. 10 (2005), available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/ctrules/
rulesofthecourt.pdf (“A petition for a writ of certiorari is rarely granted when the
asserted error consists of . . . the misapplication of a properly stated rule of law.”). The
circuits have all properly stated the rule, or statutory definition of enterprise, but
misapplied it to include legal entities in associations-in-fact. See also Mohawk Indus.
Transcript, supra note 14, at *6 (Scalia, J.) (“And we would have been unlikely to
accept cert on -- on point one alone I think.”).
121. Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Williams, 127 S. Ct. 1381 (2007).
122. See Sup. Ct. R. 10(a) (2005), available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/
ctrules/rulesofthecourt.pdf (noting that one of the primary reasons the court grants a
petition is that “a United States court of appeals has entered a decision in conflict with
the decision of another United States court of appeals on the same important matter”).
123. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-17-103(2) (2006). (“‘Enterprise’ means any individual,
sole proprietorship, partnership, corporation, trust, or other legal entity or any chartered
union, association, or group of individuals, associated in fact although not a legal entity,
and shall include illicit as well as licit enterprises and governmental as well as other
entities.”). This language, by expressly including ‘association’ without a qualifier as
one of the enterprises that may be associated-in-fact, is more permissive to the inclusion
of corporations within associated in fact enterprises than the federal statute, which is
limited to groups of individuals.
124. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa. v. Kozeny, 19 Fed. Appx. 815, 821
(10th Cir. 2001) (“We are not inclined to disturb the district court’s understanding of
C.R.S. §§ 18-17-103(2) and (4) [that corporations can be part of an associated in fact
enterprise].”).
125. See, e.g., Entre Computer Ctrs., Inc. v. FMG of Kansas City, Inc., 819 F.2d
1279, 1287 (4th Cir. 1987) (declining to reach the direct question, as the distinctness
requirement between the corporation and alleged association in fact was not met, even
where the franchisees at issue were independent legal persons), overruled by Busby v.
T
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convictions explicitly based on that theory of the RICO enterprise. 126
United States v. Najjar explicitly affirmed a conviction where the
indictment charged that individuals and a corporation “were an
association in fact and constituted an enterprise.” 127 On appeal, the
defendant attacked the conviction only on the distinctness requirements
of section 1962(c), and thus the Fourth Circuit has never directly
resolved the section 1961(4) question. 128
The Court originally granted certiorari in Mohawk Industries to
clarify the degree of distinction needed between the RICO “person” and
the “enterprise.” 129 Every circuit has now recognized what the Supreme
Court held in Kushner—that there needs to be some degree of
distinction between the two. 130 Most also have recognized that a
corporation’s association with its own employees cannot constitute an
associated-in-fact enterprise distinct from the corporation. 131 However,
Crown Supply, Inc., 896 F.2d 833, 840-41 (4th Cir. 1990) (regarding the lack of a
distinctiveness requirement in § 1962(a) as opposed to §1962(c)); United States v.
Computer Scis. Corp., 689 F.2d 1181, 1190 (4th Cir. 1982) (dismissing RICO
indictment against corporation, implicitly rejecting argument that it could be associated
in fact with its own division, stating that “[a] corporation, in common parlance, is not
regarded as distinct from its unincorporated divisions either[,] [b]earing in mind that
lenity applies even in RICO cases . . . .”), overruled by Busby, 896 F.2d at 840-41
(regarding § 1962(a)’s lack of a distinctiveness requirement); United States v. Griffin,
660 F.2d 996, 999-1000 (4th Cir. 1981) (upholding the conviction of a group of natural
persons associated in fact while noting the importance of individuals more than ten
times, in contradistinction to corporations).
126. United States v. Vogt, 910 F.2d 1184, 1193 (4th Cir. 1990) (affirming a
conviction where the RICO enterprise included five corporations associated with certain
individuals).
127. United States v. Najjar, 300 F.3d 466, 484 (4th Cir. 2002).
128. Judge Niemayer, the District Judge who decided Benard v. Hoff, 727 F. Supp.
211, 215 (D. Md. 1989), discussed supra note 47, did not sit on either the Vogt or
Najjar panels. That he is now on the Fourth Circuit creates at least the possibility that a
circuit panel with him on it would resolve the question in the proper manner, unbound
by precedent on the precise point.
129. Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Williams, 546 U.S. 1075 (2006) (mem.).
130. The Eleventh Circuit was the last to come around on this issue. See United
States v. Goldin Indus., Inc., 219 F.3d 1268, 1270 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc)
(abrogating previous circuit precedent and citing the cases from other circuits).
131. See, e.g., Bessette v. Avco Fin. Servs., Inc., 230 F.3d 439, 449 (1st Cir. 2000);
Riverwoods Chappaqua Corp. v. Marine Midland Bank, N.A., 30 F.3d 339, 344 (2d Cir.
1994); Bd. of County Comm’rs of San Juan County v. Liberty Group, 965 F.2d 879,
885-86 (10th Cir. 1992); Old Time Enters., Inc. v. Int’l Coffee Corp., 862 F.2d 1213,
1217 (5th Cir. 1989); see generally Otto Immel, Corporation-Employee Association in
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the circuits are divided on whether a corporation’s association with nonemployee agents suffices to meet the distinctness requirement and form
a RICO enterprise associated-in-fact. The Sixth, Ninth and Eleventh
Circuits all hold that as long as the agent is a legally distinct entity, the
distinctness requirement is met. 132 On the other hand, the Second,
Third, Fourth and Seventh Circuits all impose much stricter
requirements for differentiation between agents and corporations than
mere legal distinctness. 133
Fact Enterprises in Civil Rico, 60 DEF. COUNS. J. 88, 96 (1993) (noting that “the clear
weight of authority indicates that such corporation-employee associations-in-fact are
not viable RICO enterprises”).
132. See Williams v. Mohawk Indus., Inc., 465 F.3d 1277, 1284 (11th Cir. 2006)
(“This Court has never required anything other than a ‘loose or informal’ association of
distinct entities.”); Living Designs, Inc. v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., 431 F.3d
353, 361-62 (9th Cir. 2005) (“The more difficult question is whether the enterprise
formed by the group of DuPont, the law firms it employed, and the expert witnesses that
the law firms retained is separate and distinct from DuPont, the RICO ‘person’ alleged
in Plaintiffs’ complaint. We conclude that they are.”); Davis v. Mut. Life Ins. Co. of
N.Y., 6 F.3d 367, 377 (6th Cir. 1993) (holding that because the defendant was a legally
distinct entity, a RICO enterprise could be found between it and another company
which was contracted only to sell defendant’s product, even though it did note that
agents putatively would not satisfy the distinctness requirement); see generally Amy L.
Higgins, Comment, Pimpin’ Ain’t Easy Under the Eleventh Circuit’s Broad RICO
Enterprise Standard: United States v. Pipkins, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 1643, 1651-57 (2005)
(detailing the case-law of several circuits construing the breadth of RICO’s
requirement, concluding that the broad view is inferior and should be overturned);
Michael A. Gardiner, Comment, The Enterprise Requirement: Getting to the Heart of
Civil RICO, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 663, 679-91 (discussing these two schools of thought
and stating the broad view is inferior). This Article alters Gardiner’s positioning of the
circuits, however, in order to accord with precedent since 1988.
133. See Fitzgerald v. Chrysler Corp., 116 F.3d 225, 228 (7th Cir. 1997) (Posner,
C.J.) (“But it is enough to decide this case that where a large, reputable manufacturer
deals with its dealers and other agents in the ordinary way, . . . the manufacturer plus its
dealers and other agents . . . do not constitute an enterprise within the meaning of the
statute.”); Riverwoods, 30 F.3d at 344 (“Nevertheless, by alleging a RICO enterprise
that consists merely of a corporate defendant associated with its own employees or
agents carrying on the regular affairs of the defendant, the distinctness requirement may
not be circumvented.”); Brittingham v. Mobil Corp., 943 F.2d 297, 301 (3d Cir. 1991)
(quoting and agreeing with the District Court: “It noted that a corporation always acts
through its employees and agents, and found that ‘[a]ccepting plaintiffs’ contention
would also be akin to read[ing] the enterprise requirement out of the statute entirely,
whenever a corporate defendant is involved.’” (internal quotation and citation omitted)),
overruled by Jaguar Cars, Inc. v. Royal Oaks Motor Car Co., 46 F.3d 258 (3d Cir. 1995)
(on other grounds); Entre Computer Ctrs., Inc. v. FMG of Kansas City, Inc., 819 F.2d
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The circuits also disagree over whether, and to what degree, an
associated-in-fact enterprise must possess some ascertainable structure
separate from the racketeering activity. The narrow camp, represented
on this issue by the Third, Fourth, Eighth and Tenth Circuits, requires
that the association possess some cognizable structure separate from the
racketeering activity. 134 The Seventh Circuit requires a structure but
does not require that it be separate from the racketeering. 135 No
1279, 1287 (4th Cir. 1987) (finding that the distinctness requirement was not met, even
where the franchisees at issue were independent legal persons), overruled by Busby v.
Crown Supply, Inc., 896 F.2d 833, 840-41 (4th Cir. 1990) (regarding the lack of a
distinctiveness requirement in § 1962(a) as opposed to §1962(c)); United States v.
Computer Scis. Corp. 689 F.2d 1181, 1190 (4th Cir. 1982) (dismissing RICO
indictment against corporation, implicitly rejecting argument that it could be associated
in fact with its own division, stating that “[a] corporation, in common parlance, is not
regarded as distinct from its unincorporated divisions either[,][b]earing in mind that
lenity applies even in RICO cases . . . .”), overruled by Busby v. Crown Supply, Inc.
896 F.2d 833, 840-41 (4th Cir. 1990) (regarding § 1962(a)’s lack of a distinctiveness
requirement); see also Odishelidze v. Aetna Life & Cas. Co., 853 F.2d 21, 23-24 (1st
Cir. 1988) (concerning subsidiaries, but using similar language); see generally Laurence
A. Steckman, RICO Section 1962(c) Enterprises and the Present Status of the
“Distinctiveness Requirement” in the Second, Third, and Seventh Circuits, 21 TOURO
L. REV. 1083 (2006) (providing two hundred pages of detailed analysis of the evolution
of the doctrines in these circuits, Part IV is especially helpful for this issue).
134. See Asa-Brandt, Inc. v. ADM Investor Servs., Inc., 344 F.3d 738, 752 (8th Cir.
2003) (noting that “enterprise must have . . . an ascertainable structure distinct from the
pattern of racketeering”) (citing Handeen v. Lemaire, 112 F.3d 1339, 1351 (8th Cir.
1997)); United States v. Sanders, 928 F.2d 940, 944 (10th Cir. 1991) (noting that
“enterprise” requires evidence of “an ascertainable structure that exist[s] apart from the
commission of racketeering acts”); United States v. Tillett, 763 F.2d 628, 632 (4th Cir.
1985) (noting that “enterprise” requires evidence “to show that the organization had an
existence beyond that which was necessary to commit the predicate crimes”) (citations
omitted); United States v. Riccobene, 709 F.2d 214, 223-24 (3d Cir. 1983) (noting that
“enterprise” must have “an existence beyond that which is necessary merely to commit
each of the acts charged as predicate racketeering offenses”); United States v. Bledsoe,
674 F.2d 647, 665 (8th Cir. 1982) (noting that proof of ascertainable structure “might be
demonstrated by proof that a group engaged in a diverse pattern of crimes or that it has
an organizational pattern or system of authority beyond what was necessary to
perpetrate the predicate crimes”).
135. See United States v. Rogers, 89 F.3d 1326, 1337 (7th Cir. 1996) (imposing
“some” structural requirements, but concluding that it would be “nonsensical to require
proof that an enterprise had purposes or goals separate and apart from the pattern of
racketeering activity”); see also Richmond v. Nationwide Cassel L.P., 52 F.3d 640, 644
(7th Cir. 1995) (requiring proof of “an ongoing structure of persons associated through
time, joined in purpose, and organized in a manner amenable to hierarchical or
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structure at all is required by the First, Second, Ninth, Eleventh and
District of Columbia Circuits. 136 As yet, the Supreme Court has not
granted certiorari to address the confusion in the lower courts on this
important question of federal law. If the Court does consider the issue in
a case involving corporate defendants allegedly associated-in-fact, the
case would present the logically antecedent question of whether such
corporation can ever be a part of an association-in-fact. 137
Attorneys representing corporations alleged to be part of
“associated-in-fact” RICO enterprises need to preserve this issue and
raise it with the courts of appeal and, potentially, the Supreme Court. 138
consensual decision-making” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
136. See Odom v. Microsoft Corp., 486 F.3d 541, 551 (9th Cir. 2007) (“To require
that an associated-in-fact enterprise have a structure beyond that necessary to carry out
its racketeering activities would be to require precisely what the Court in Turkette held
that RICO does not require.”), cert. denied, 76 U.S.L.W. 3199 (2007); United States v.
Patrick, 248 F.3d 11, 19 (1st Cir. 2001) (“Since Congress intended the term ‘enterprise’
to include both legal and criminal enterprises, and because the latter may not observe
the niceties of legitimate organizational structures, we refuse to import an ‘ascertainable
structure’ requirement into jury instructions.”) (citation omitted); United States v.
Perholtz, 842 F.2d 343, 354 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (concluding that enterprise is “established
by common purpose among the participants, organization, and continuity”); United
States v. Cagnina, 697 F.2d 915, 921 (11th Cir. 1983) (“Turkette did not suggest that
the enterprise must have a distinct, formalized structure.”); United States v. Bagaric,
706 F.2d 42, 56 (2d Cir. 1983) (stating that “it is logical to characterize any associative
group in terms of what it does, rather than by abstract analysis of its structure”),
abrogated by Nat’l Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249 (1994) (on other
grounds).
137. This Article only provides a brief sketch of these two major splits and much
more can be said on these two. The circuits disagree on several other RICO
interpretation issues as well. Consultation with attorneys with exposure to several
circuits is recommended in order to preserve these issues for appeal. Litigants should
take care to perform the proper maintenance on the appellate vehicle.
138. See Mohawk Indus. Transcript, supra note 14 at *10-11. At the oral argument
before the Supreme Court in Mohawk Industries, Carter Phillips, facing questioning
about a concession in the lower court that corporations could be part of an associatedin-fact enterprise, argued that it would have been “futile” to raise the claim that a
corporation does not fit within the definition of an “association in fact” in the Eleventh
Circuit because the law was so established. Id. At the same time, however, he argued
that it was “equally true that none of them [the circuit courts] has analyzed this issue
with anything near the kind of care that would at least give me comfort that they’ve
finally and fully resolved the issue.” Id. at *11. Phillips, who appears to have been an
advocate with a strong argument that had not been properly raised below, tried to justify
his effort to have the Supreme Court consider it nonetheless by claiming it was
subsumed in the question presented and “we’re not going to get a more thorough vetting
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Because of the current status of the circuit court law on this issue, many
defendants either concede the argument or fail to raise it in the trial
courts. 139 Litigants, however, may challenge “settled” law when they do
so in a good faith, non-frivolous way. 140 The arguments set forth in this
Article could form the basis for a good faith request for a change in the
law in those circuits that have previously addressed this issue.
CONCLUSION
The current circuit conclusion—that corporations can be part of
groups of individuals associated-in-fact—permits most routine business
disputes and tort claims, or “garden variety” fraud with multiple
defendants, to be litigated as RICO claims at a tremendous cost to our
national economy. 141 The pestilence of these suits led one commentator
to describe their proliferation as its own racket. 142 In those circuits
which take the broadest view of the statutory definition of enterprise,
of it at this point because the circuits are – are at this – at this stage essentially lined up.
So the right time and opportunity for the Court is here.” Id. The Chief Justice did not
seem persuaded, beginning the thought, “Well, unless somebody raises it. Unless
somebody raised it below to preserve it for the rehearing en banc or – or some other
way.” Id.
139. See, e.g., Odom, 486 F.3d at 548 (“It is undisputed that a corporation can be an
‘individual’ for purposes of an associated-in-fact enterprise.”).
140. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(2) (setting forth the good faith requirements with
which lawyers filing pleadings briefs must comply). It treats the filing of a document
signed by an attorney as a representation that the “claims, defenses, and other legal
contentions therein are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the
extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law.”
Id.
141. See, e.g., Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 499 (1985) (“Instead of
being used against mobsters and organized criminals, [RICO] has become a tool for
everyday fraud cases . . . .”) (emphasis added); All World Prof’l Travel Servs., Inc. v.
Am. Airlines, Inc., 282 F. Supp. 2d 1161 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (travel agency alleging that
airline violated RICO and breached its contract with agency by forcing it to pay fee for
processing refunds). But see G. Robert Blakey & Scott D. Cessar, Equitable Relief
Under Civil RICO: Reflections on Religious Technology Center v. Wollersheim: Will
Civil RICO Be Effective Only Against White-Collar Crime?, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
526, 569 (1987) (criticizing the use of the term garden variety fraud).
142. See Paul I. Rachlin, Note, RICO’s New Community of Racketeers: The Need for
a Prior Criminal Conviction Requirement, 64 WASH. U. L.Q. 229, 231 (1986); see also
Sedima, 473 U.S. at 506 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“It is thus not surprising that civil
RICO has been used for extortive purposes, giving rise to the very evils that it was
designed to combat.”).
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plaintiffs are able to assert a RICO claim against a corporation any time
the corporation hires a contractor to perform a related task, thereby
forming an association-in-fact. 143 Exposed to the tremendous liability of
ruinous treble damages and the stigma of the “racketeer” label, 144
defendant corporations face a Hobson’s, or even Hobbesian, choice—
either accept that risk or settle the suit. 145
Such a prisoner’s dilemma was not the aim of RICO’s drafters, who
intended the statute to be a new weapon against organized crime,
deployed in protection of legitimate businesses. 146 The judicial error
came about largely because appellate courts were not confronted with
the modern abuse of RICO when drafting early opinions, 147 and
therefore read the statute broadly without fear of misapplication.
Pandora’s Box was opened, therefore, without a full appreciation of its
contents. As the abuse of civil RICO multiplied, the Supreme Court has
pruned its applicability to garden variety fraud. 148 In its most recent
143.
144.

See supra, note 132.
See, e.g., Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 285 (1992)
(O’Connor, J., concurring) (“In addition to the threat of treble damages, a defendant
faces the stigma of being labeled a ‘racketeer.’”); Miranda v. Ponce Fed. Bank, 948
F.2d 41, 44 (1st Cir. 1991) (“Civil RICO is an unusually potent weapon—the litigation
equivalent of a thermonuclear device. The very pendency of a RICO suit can be
stigmatizing and its consummation can be costly; a prevailing plaintiff, for example,
stands to receive treble damages and attorneys’ fees.”); Ruiz v. Alegria, 896 F.2d 645,
650 (1st Cir. 1990) (“The mere assertion of a RICO claim consequently has an almost
inevitable stigmatizing effect on those named as defendants. In fairness to innocent
parties, courts should strive to flush out frivolous RICO allegations at an early stage of
the litigation.”); United States v. Anderson, 626 F.2d 1358, 1361 n.2 (8th Cir. 1980)
(“This creates a situation where the reversal of the RICO counts does not affect the
sentences of the defendants. Nevertheless, we consider it necessary to review the
convictions on the RICO counts . . . because of the possible stigma stemming from the
connotations surrounding the offense of ‘racketeering.’”).
145. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 506 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“Many a prudent defendant,
facing ruinous exposure, will decide to settle even a case with no merit.”); Crawford v.
Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 42 n.1 (2004) (quoting, with approval, the lower court’s
description of an evidentiary ruling as presenting “an untenable Hobson’s choice”). Cf.
THOMAS HOBBES, THE LEVIATHAN 120 (1967) (“[A] man is naturally obliged to hand
over his money to a thug who points a revolver at him and says ‘Your money or your
life.’”).
146. See the discussion of RICO’s legislative history supra notes 50-56 and
accompanying text.
147. See supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text.
148. See Sabrina Tavernise, Russian Suit is Dismissed in U.S. Court, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 1, 2003, at W1 (“A series of recent rulings by the United States Supreme Court has
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case, the majority, notably joined by Justices Stevens, heightened the
causation requirement under section 1964(c), limiting RICO suits to
private plaintiffs who could prove direct causation. 149
This Article contends that the Court is primed to give the statutory
definition of “enterprise” a more considered, textual reading that would
exclude corporations from the definition of associated-in-fact
enterprises. This would close Pandora’s Box, ridding legitimate
corporations of the financial drain of RICO strike suits. A close reading
of the statutory language and the application of familiar rules of
statutory construction, such as the rule of lenity and the principle that no
language should be rendered superfluous, urge the conclusion that legal
entities cannot be part of a group of individuals, associated-in-fact.
Notably, this textual reading does not insulate corporations from liability
when they violate the law. Business fraud, when proven, can be reached
through the ordinary criminal and civil statutes enacted to forbid such
activity. Indeed, the illegal actions of a corporation, qua corporation,
are themselves reachable through RICO. The statute permits any form
of legal entities to be, itself, the enterprise 150 or person. 151 A proper
reading of RICO, therefore, would return that statute to its racketeering
roots while still providing adequate remedies for violations of the law.

reined in use of the [RICO] statute somewhat, but it remains one of the most powerful
legal weapons available in the United States.”).
149. Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 126 S. Ct. 1991, 1998 (2006) (“When a court
evaluates a RICO claim for proximate causation, the central question it must ask is
whether the alleged violation led directly to the plaintiff’s injuries.”). This direct
causation requirement has created its own split in the circuits. Compare James Cape &
Sons Co. v. PCC Constr. Co., 453 F.3d 396, 403 (7th Cir. 2006) (requiring proof of
direct causation), with Williams v. Mohawk Indus. Inc., 465 F.3d 1277, 1289 (11th Cir.
2006) (permitting proof of “direct correlation”).
150. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (2006); see also United States v. Feldman, 853 F.2d
648, 655 (9th Cir. 1988) (“Each individual corporation is in itself a legal entity and,
alone, may be charged as the RICO enterprise.”). Feldman is the seminal precedent in
the Ninth Circuit that corporations can be part of a group of individuals.
151. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(3) (2006) (“‘person’ includes any individual or entity . . . .”
(emphasis added)); see, e.g., Liquid Air Corp. v. Rogers, 834 F.2d 1297, 1306 (7th Cir.
1987) (“A corporation may be a ‘person’ under RICO.”).

